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Abstract
An apparent paradox proposed by Aharonov and Vaidman in which a single particle
can be found with certainty in two (or more) boxes is analyzed by way of a simple
thought experiment. It is found that the apparent paradox arises from an invalid
counterfactual usage of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule, and effectively
attributes conflicting properties not to the same particle but to different particles. A
connection is made between the present analysis and the consistent histories formulation
of Griffiths. Finally, a critique is given of some recent counterarguments by Vaidman
against the rejection of the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule.
1. Background.
The Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule is a well-known formula for
calculating the probabilities of the possible outcomes of observables measured
at an intermediate time t1 between pre- and post-selection measurements at
∗rkastner@wam.umd.edu
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times t0 and tf , respectively [Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz, 1964]. If an
intermediate measurement of (possibly degenerate) observable C with eigen-
values {ci} is performed at time t1, the ABL rule states that the probability of
outcome cj in the case of a preselection for the state |ψ0〉 and a post-selection
for the state |ψf 〉 is given by:1
PABL(cj|ψ0, ψf) =
|〈ψf |Pcj |ψ0〉|2∑
i |〈ψf |Pci|ψ0〉|2
(1)
where Pcj is the projection operator on the eigenspace corresponding to out-
come cj .
In the formulation of quantum theory known as “Time Symmetrized Quan-
tum Theory,” (cf. Aharonov and Vaidman, 1991), a system thus pre- and
post-selected is labelled by a time-symmetric “two-state vector” Ψ = 〈ψf ||ψ0〉.
It has recently been shown2 that the ABL rule cannot be used in a counter-
factual sense: i.e., in general, it cannot be used to calculate the probabilities
of possible outcomes of observables that have not actually been measured at
time t1. This result has been implicit all along in the consistent histories for-
mulation of Griffiths (1984, 1996, 1998), which gives precise conditions under
which meaningful, “classical” probabilities can be assigned to the outcomes
of real or hypothetical measurements. (Indeed, the ABL rule can be seen as
one simple instance of the consistent histories approach; this is shown in the
Appendix.)
A quantitative distinction is made in Kastner (1998) between the valid, non-
counterfactual usage and the generally invalid, counterfactual usage. This in-
1In this case, the Hamiltonian H = 0; the ABL rule also applies to the more general case
of nonzero Hamiltonian, with a time-dependence of the pre- and post-selection states in the
usual way.
2Sharp and Shanks (1993), Cohen (1995), Miller (1996), Kastner (1998).
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volves augmenting the ABL probability PABL in (1) with an additional param-
eter specifying which observable has actually been measured in the selection
of any particular system. Thus if system X has been pre- and post-selected
in the state Ψ = 〈ψf ||ψ0〉 via an intervening measurement of observable C at
time t1, the augmented ABL probability is written as:
PABL(xj|ψ0, ψf ;C) =
|〈ψf |Pxj |ψ0〉|2∑
i |〈ψf |Pxi|ψ0〉|2
, (1′)
where the outcome whose probability is being calculated is denoted by the
general parameter xj . The correct, non-counterfactual usage restricts xj to
the set of eigenvalues {ci} of C; the (generally) incorrect, counterfactual usage
consists of allowing xj to vary over values not in the range of C.
2. The three-box example.
In his ‘Weak-Measurement Elements of Reality’ (1996), Vaidman discusses
an example of what he terms an “ideal-measurement element of reality of
the pre- and post-selected system” (‘ideal’ in the sense of ideal measurements
rather than weak measurements; cf. Vaidman (1996, p. 899)). This consists
of a single particle and three boxes labeled A, B, and C. The particle is pre-
selected at time t0 in the state
|ψ0〉 = 1√
3
(
|a〉+ |b〉+ |c〉
)
(2a)
and post-selected at time tf > t0 in the state
|ψf〉 = 1√
3
(
|a〉+ |b〉 − |c〉
)
, (2b)
where the states |a〉, |b〉, and |c〉 correspond to the particle being found in box
A, B, or C, respectively. The pre- and post-selected states |ψ0〉 and |ψf 〉 are not
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orthogonal and can be viewed as eigenvectors of two different observables Q0
and Qf . Let the eigenbasis of observable Q0 be labelled as {|ψ0〉, |ψ′0〉, |ψ′′0〉},
and similarly for Qf .
The two possible intermediate measurements at time t1 are of two observables
A and B, corresponding to opening box A or opening box B. They are defined
as follows:
A = a|a〉〈a|+ a′[|b〉〈b|+ |c〉〈c|], (3a)
and
B = b|b〉〈b|+ b′[|a〉〈a|+ |c〉〈c|], (3b)
where a′ and b′ are the eigenvalues corresponding to finding the particle to be
not in box A or B, respectively. Their associated eigenspaces are the planes bc
and ac (See Figure 1). We also define the states
|a′〉 = 1√
2
(|b〉+ |c〉) (4a)
|b′〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉+ |c〉) (4b)
obtained by projecting the initial state |ψ0〉 onto the degenerate eigenspaces
corresponding to the planes bc and ac, respectively. These states describe the
system after a minimally disturbing measurement of A or B yielding outcome
a′ or b′, i.e., the outcome in which the particle is found to be not in the box
which was opened.
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Figure 1
The pre- and post-selected states |ψ0〉 and |ψf 〉 in the three-box basis.
|a′〉 = 1√
2
(|b〉+ |c〉)
|c〉
|a〉
|b〉
|ψ0〉
|ψf〉
|b′〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉+ |c〉)
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With the above pre- and post-selection, the ABL rule (1) gives probability
one for an outcome of either a or b at time t1 (t0 < t1 < tf) upon measurement
of observable A or B corresponding to opening box A or box B.
3. Analysis and resolution.
Vaidman interprets the above results as indicating that there are two ‘ele-
ments of reality’ for this system, corresponding to both the particle being in
box A (if we look for it there) and the particle being in box B (if we look for it
there). These ‘elements of reality’ are, indeed, highly peculiar and counterin-
tuitive. But need we really accept them as ‘elements of reality’? I will argue in
the negative: these results cannot be interpreted as applying to an individual
system such as the particle in the above example.
Consider first an experiment in which we start with a large number of sys-
tems pre-selected in state |ψ0〉 and we choose to open box A at time t1, thus
measuring observable A (see Figure 2(a)).
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Figure 2
|ψ0〉
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)
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)
|ψf 〉
|ψ′f 〉
|ψ′′f 〉
|ψ′f〉
|ψ′′f 〉
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)
(a) (0)|ψf 〉
|ψ0〉
|b〉
|b′〉
(1
3
)
(2
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|ψf 〉
|ψ′f 〉
|ψ′′f 〉
|ψ′f 〉
|ψ′′f 〉
(1
9
)
(b) (0)|ψf 〉
(a): A measurement of observable A is performed at time t1. The numbers in parentheses
indicate the fraction of particles selected in the given state at each measurement.
(b): A measurement of observable B is performed at time t1.
✲
t1t0 tf
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Of those systems, roughly 1/3 will be found in box A and 2/3 will be found
to be not in box A. Subsequently, when we perform the post-selection mea-
surement of Qf , the distribution will be as follows: of those systems found at
time t1 in box A, 1/3 will be post-selected in the state |ψf〉. However, none
of the particles that were found to be not in A can be post-selected in state
|ψf 〉, since the state |a′〉 corresponding to “not in box A” is orthogonal to |ψf〉.
Thus the actual process occurring in this experiment is one in which roughly
1/9 of the pre-selected particles will be post-selected; and all the particles that
are post-selected will be guaranteed to be ones that were found in box A at
time t1.
If we consider an experiment in which the observable B is measured at time
t1, we observe exactly the same statistics but with the roles of observables A
and B interchanged (Figure 2b). In each case, any particles which end up post-
selected are ones which could not have been in any box except the one which
was opened (be it A or B). Thus, we see that a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for post-selection of a particular particle X via a measurement of (for
instance) A is that particle X was found in box A at time t1. Since the same
particle X’s being found in box A and being found in box B at the same instant
of time are mutually exclusive states of affairs, for purely physical reasons it
is clearly incorrect to say of any such particle X that it had a probability 1 of
being found in box B at time t1.
To make a claim about the elements of reality of an individual system, we
have to consider the physical situation involved in an individual run of the
experiment. But in each run, we have to make a choice as to measure A or B.
In the cases that we choose to measure A, all successfully post-selected particles
had to be found in box A at t1, and mutatis mutandis for a measurement of
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B. This means that it is not valid to say of any individual particle, “If in the
intermediate time it was searched for in box A, it has to be found there with
probability one, and if, instead, it was searched for in box B, it has to be found
there too with probability one...” (Vaidman, 1996).
The same argument applies to the generalized example of a particle in N +1
boxes as discussed by Aharonov and Vaidman (1991). Aharonov and Vaidman
say of this example, “in spite of the fact that we have only one particle in
the above situation, we find this particle with probability one in any one of
the first N boxes” (1991, p. 2318). However, as shown above, this statement
is inaccurate in the sense that the property of being with certainty in any
one of N boxes (depending on which one is opened) cannot apply to the same
individual particle in any given run of the experiment. Thus these ‘elements of
reality,’ as defined by Vaidman, are not really properties of individual systems
but apply only to ensembles.
The fallacy of attributing these “peculiar” properties to a single particle can
be seen as arising directly from the counterfactual reading of the ABL rule.
As noted above, in any given run of the experiment in a which a given particle
X is post-selected, we can measure only one of the two observables A and B.
Once we have chosen one of these, say A, it is erroneous to apply a counterfac-
tual reading of the ABL rule to particle X with respect to a measurement of
observable B which has not actually occurred in the process of post-selecting
that particle. (As noted in section 1, this point is further elaborated upon
in the Appendix, which discusses conditions for validity of the counterfactual
ABL usage in terms of Griffiths’ consistent histories formalism.)3
4. Critique of Vaidman’s counterarguments
In his most recent paper, Vaidman (1998) presents counterarguments to
3cf. Griffiths (1984), (1996), (1998).
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some recent refutations of the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule. Vaid-
man claims that the refutations are based on confusion about the evaluation
of counterfactual statements in quantum theory, especially with respect to its
indeterminism; and about the role of time symmetry in counterfactual state-
ments. However, none of these counterarguments succeed in identifying any
flaw in the refutations, as will be shown below.
Vaidman starts by noting that “there is a general philosophical trend to con-
sider counterfactuals to be asymmetric in time” (1998, p.2). He then quotes
Lewis: “I believe that indeterminism is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
asummetries I am discussing. Therefore I shall ignore the possibility of inde-
terminism in the rest of this paper, and see how the asymmetries might arise
even even under strict determinism.” (Lewis 1986, p.37) Vaidman states that,
“in contrast to this opinion”, he believes that “indeterminism is crucial for al-
lowing non-trivial time-symmetric counterfactuals, and that Lewis’s and other
general philosophical analyses are irrelevant for the issue of counterfactuals in
quantum theory.”
This opening statement is a very curious one for several reasons. It starts by
making an observation that time asymmetry is usually assumed in theories of
counterfactuals, while making no attempt to show that such theories depend
in any way on time asymmetry–the latter being the crucial consideration.
The mere fact that time asymmetry may be a metaphysical presupposition or
prejudice falls far short of showing that classical theories of counterfactuals are
inimical or irrelevant to time-symmetric counterfactuals. So the observation
about time-asymmetry preferences in no way casts doubt on the soundness or
appropriateness of theories such as Lewis’ or Stalnaker’s (1968) for analyzing
time-symmetric counterfactuals.
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Now to the question of indeterminism. The sketch of an argument by Vaid-
man, given above, is incomplete at best. It appears to take Lewis’ above-quoted
statement in favor of the sufficiency of determinism for time asymmetric coun-
terfactuals as being contrary to Vaidman’s view in favor of the necessity of
indeterminism for time symmetric counterfactuals, which it is not. Vaidman
then summarily takes the same argument by Lewis as an indication against the
applicability of Lewis’ theory to indeterministic or time-symmetric situations.
However, none of these negative assertions about Lewis’ theory has been
supported by sound, or even anything approaching complete, arguments. In
particular, it has not been shown that Lewis’ theory is intrinsically inapplicable
either to indeterminism or to time symmetry.4 Thus, it is specious to suggest
that any theory of counterfactuals that considers deterministic and/or time
asymmetric situations is automatically disqualified for use with indetermin-
istic and/or time-symmetric situations. Vaidman’s conclusion that “Lewis’s
and other general philosophical analyses are irrelevant for the issue of coun-
terfactuals in quantum theory” would appear to be a completely groundless
dismissal of a perfectly general and sound counterfactual theory.
Furthermore, Vaidman then goes on to claim that “the key questions in
[Lewis’ and similar theories] are related to [the antecedent] A....Do we need
a ‘miracle’ (i.e., breaking the laws of physics) for A?...”, and asserts that
“miracles” are “the main topic of discussion on counterfactuals in general phi-
losophy.” (1998, p.2) Again, this is simply incorrect. In his seminal book
Counterfactuals, Lewis spends three pages, out of a total of 142, discussing
miracles (1973, pp. 75-77); this is in connection with a discussion of the im-
portance of laws of nature in determining the closeness of worlds under the
4A good indication that Lewis in no way presupposes determinism in his theory is the
following statement, (Lewis 1973, p. 75): “Suppose that the laws prevailing at a world i are
deterministic as we used to think the laws of our own world were.”
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relevant similarity relation. Thus, despite Vaidman’s suggestions to the con-
trary, Lewis’ theory is perfectly applicable in an indeterministic universe where
miracles are irrelevant.
Vaidman goes on to propose a definition for time-symmetric counterfactuals
in quantum theory. His definition is based on a proposed similarity relation
which “fixes” the pre- and post-selection outcomes. A detailed critique of
this definition has already been given in Kastner (1998); these arguments will
not be repeated here except to note that the “fixing” requirement is highly
problematic and amounts to proposing an unphysical similarity relation.
In this paper, we discuss an additional problem with Vaidman’s proposal for
a time-symmetrized counterfactual: a problem with the syntax of the definition
which reflects a confusion between the non-counterfactual and counterfactual
usage of the ABL rule.
Vaidman’s proposed definition is:
“If it were that a measurement of an observable A has been performed at
time t1, t0 < t1 < tf , then the probability for A = ai would be equal to pi,
provided that the results of measurements performed on the system at times
t0 and tf are fixed.”
5 (1998, p.5) (*)
The above definition incorporates a strange and awkward mixing of tenses:
“If it were that...”(the subjunctive tense) juxtaposed with “a measurement
of an observable A has been performed...” (the past perfect tense). This
muddling of tenses suggests that the definition attempts to strike a ‘middle
ground’ between two distinct usages: (a) “If observable A was measured, then
the probability for A = ai (at time t1) was equal to pi.” This is the non-
counterfactual (i.e., material conditional) usage of the ABL rule, and it is
5I have slightly changed the notation for consistency with that used in this discussion and in the Appendix.
In the original quote, Vaidman uses t1 instead of t0, t instead of t1, and t2 instead of tf .
12
correct, as discussed in Kastner (1998). (b) “If observable A had beenmeasured
(instead of some other observable which was actually measured), then the
probability for A = ai (at time t1) would have been pi.” This is the bona fide
subjunctive conditional, or counterfactual, usage, and it is generally incorrect,
as discussed in Kastner (1998).
Consider the two usages (a) and (b) in the context of an actual experimental
situation. If observable A was actually measured at time t1, then usage (a) ap-
plies nontrivially and usage (b) reduces to the case of a counterfactual with true
antecedent, or a material conditional (see Lewis 1973, p. 26); in other words
it becomes logically equivalent to (a). If, on the other hand, observable A was
not actually measured, but instead some other (noncommuting) observable B,
then usage (a) is still correct but now applies only vacuously (i.e., proposition
(a) is vacuously true). Meanwhile, usage (b) becomes a bona fide counterfac-
tual with false antecedent; this usage is now incorrect, and proposition (b) is
false.
Once it is admitted that some definite observable (perhaps the trivial ob-
servable I corresponding to no measurement) was actually measured in the
selection of any given system–regardless of whether or not we are privy to
that information–we are forced to choose between the two situations described
above. If observable A was actually measured at time t1, then (a) is equiva-
lent to (b) and they both apply; if observable A was not actually measured at
time t1, then (a) is still (vacuously) correct but (b) is not (except in certain
special cases, as discussed in Kastner (1998), Cohen (1995)). Thus Definition
(*), as it stands, is grammatically incorrect in a way that reflects its lack of
clarity and rigor with respect to the physically crucial point concerning which
measurement has actually taken place.
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5. Conclusion
It has been argued that an apparent paradox proposed by Aharonov and
Vaidman (1991), and further amplified by Vaidman (1996), to illustrate pecu-
liarities of time-symmetric quantum systems is not a true paradox, but arises
from an invalid counterfactual usage of the ABL rule. The paradox consists
in the apparent assignment of mutually exclusive properties to a system; how-
ever it is resolved by noting that these properties can never be simultaneously
attributed to the same individual system. A connection is made between this
problem and the consistent histories approach of Griffiths. In addition, some
counterarguments by Vaidman against refutations of the counterfactual usage
of the ABL rule are analyzed and shown to be ineffective.
6. Appendix
The consistent histories (henceforth ‘CH’) approach pioneered by Griffiths
(1984, 1996, 1998) has been widely discussed in connection with the problem
of assigning properties to quantum systems independent of measurement. In
particular, Cohen (1995, pp. 4376-7) gives a concise summary of the basic
features of the formulation in that context. In this Appendix we will very
briefly review the fundamental features of CH in order to relate it to the ABL
rule. Readers desiring a more complete exposition of CH may wish to refer to
the Griffiths and/or Cohen references noted above.
A “history” as defined by Griffiths is a series of events
D → E1 → E2 → . . .→ F, (5)
occurring at times t0, t1, . . . tf , with the subscripts on the events denoting the
time of their occurrence; events D and F represent the initial and final events
occurring at t0 and tf , respectively.
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A particular history is considered as a member of a family of histories associ-
ated with the “events sets” [Eαi ], where [E
α
i ] is a set of orthogonal projections,
i.e.,
EαkE
β
k = δαβE
α
k (6)
comprising a decomposition of the identity:
1 =
∑
α
Eαk . (7)
For the special case in which we are interested, that is, three time indices
(t0 < t1 < tf ) and zero Hamiltonian, a given history is considered to be a
consistent history if and only if, for all α 6= β the histories in its associated
event sets satisfy the condition:
ReTr((DEαF )† DEβF ) = 0. (8)
This condition ensures that the probabilities of disjoint individual histories
comprising the family are additive, thus disallowing quantum mechanical ‘in-
terference’ between mutually exclusive histories. Families of histories satisfying
condition (8) are called “consistent families”, or “frameworks”.
The probability of a given consistent history Y ,
Y = D ∧ Eα ∧ F (9)
is then given by
P (Y ) = Tr((DEαF )†DEαF ) = Tr(EαDEαF ), (10)
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using the fact that projection operators are idempotent and self-adjoint, and
that the trace is invariant under cyclic permutations. Since the above now
behaves exactly as an ordinary classical probability, this result can be extended
in the usual way to conditional probabilities via Bayes’ rule, i.e.:
P (Eα|D ∧ F ) = P (D ∧ E
α ∧ F )
P (D ∧ F ) (11)
= Tr(EαDEαF )/Tr(DF ). (12)
The consistent histories formulation applies to a closed system usually taken
to be a composite of quantum system S and measuring apparatus M, with
associated Hilbert space H = S ⊗M. In order to relate the conditional
probability in (11) to the ABL rule, consider a typical experiment in which sys-
tem S is preselected in state |D〉 and post-selected in state |F 〉. In accordance
with the notation of Griffiths, we denote the projection operators associated
with quantum states simply by the letters labeling the state. Apparatus M,
which measures the post-selection observable, starts out at time t0 in a ready
state M0. At time t1, the apparatus remains untriggered but we consider a
framework in which S has some value Ck associated with an arbitrary observ-
able C defined over the system Hilbert space S. At time tf , apparatus M has
been triggered in state MF corresponding to finding the system in state F .
Thus the history analogous to (5) is in this case:
D ⊗M0 → Ck ⊗M0 → F ⊗MF , (13)
We can now make the connection with the ABL rule, which (in its counter-
factual form) essentially asks: What is the probability that the system is in
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state Ck at time t1, given that it was preselected in state D and post-selected
in state F ? 6
In the Griffiths formalism, this probability is given by:
P (Ck|(D⊗M0)∧(F⊗MF )) = Tr[(D ⊗M0)(Ck ⊗ I)(F ⊗MF )(Ck ⊗ I)]
Tr[(D ⊗M0)(F ⊗MF )] (14)
=
Tr(DCkFCk)Tr(M0MF )
Tr(DF )Tr(M0MF )
=
∑
i〈Ci|DCkFCk|Ci〉∑
i〈Ci|DF |Ci〉
=
〈Ck|DCkF |Ck〉∑
i,j〈Ci|D|Cj〉〈Cj|F |Ci〉
(15)
.
Note that (15) is only equivalent to the ABL rule if we further assume that
the history Y is consistent, 7 i.e., that for i 6= j,
Re(〈Ci|D|Cj〉〈Cj|F |Ci〉) = 0. (16)
Applying that condition, we then can say:
PCH(Ck|D⊗M0∧F ⊗MF ) = 〈Ck|DCkF |Ck〉∑
i〈Ci|D|Ci〉〈Ci|F |Cj〉
=
|〈D|Ck|F 〉|2∑
i |〈D|Ci|F 〉|2
, (17)
which is the ABL rule. Thus, the ABL rule can be obtained as a special case
of the consistent histories approach.
The counterfactual usage of the ABL rule is equivalent to asserting that
6The non-counterfactual usage corresponds to the question: Given that a measurement of
observable C is performed at t1 on the pre- and post-selected system, what is the probability
that the measurement outcome is Ck?
7This discussion assumes we are considering a counterfactual measurement, i.e., proba-
bilities associated with outcomes of an observable C that has not actually been measured.
If C is actually measured at time t1, then (according to the orthodox interpretation) the
interference terms corresponding to i 6= j vanish upon measurement.
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histories associated with an observable that was not actually measured at time
t1 may be meaningfully added to the event set {D, [Eα], F}. In the three-box
example, the two observables that could be measured at t1 are A and B. The
counterfactual usage thus corresponds to the set of histories
ψ0 → [Aα, Bα]→ ψf (18)
where
A1 = a,
A2 = b+ c,
B1 = b,
and B2 = a+ c.
However, (18) is not a consistent family, as can be seen by applying the con-
sistency condition (8) or (16). For Eα = a and Eβ = b we find the nonvanishing
result:
ReTr
[
(ψ0 a ψf )
† ψ0 b ψf
]
= Re
[
〈a|ψ0|b〉〈b|ψf |a〉)
]
=
1
9
6= 0. (19)
Since condition (16) fails, we cannot use the ABL rule to calculate the prob-
ability of any particular value of either A or B at time t1, but instead must use
(15). As Griffiths (1984, 1996, 1998) has shown, only if the family of histories
is consistent can we combine probabilities in the classical way so as to make
inferences such as “If I had measured B instead of A at t1, particle X would
have been in box B”.
According to Griffiths, it is “not meaningful” to consider together the prob-
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abilities of histories that are not consistent, i.e., which belong to different
frameworks.8 While terms such as “not meaningful” might be criticized on
the same basis as has been classical positivism (i.e., it has long been recog-
nized that dismissals by positivists of certain statements as “meaningless” have
been untenable 9), Griffiths’ admonition not to combine probabilities of histo-
ries belonging to inconsistent families has important physical content, as can
be seen in reference to the three-box example. Specifically, in this example,
the proscription against combining those probabilities obtained by applying
the ABL rule first to a measurement of observable A and then again to a mea-
surement of observable B corresponds physically to the fact that the associated
properties (being in box A or being in box B) cannot be possessed by the same
individual particle.
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